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Abstract
Increased penetration of distributed energy
resources throughout the power sector has introduced
a new entity in electricity markets, namely, prosumers,
with the dual nature of concurrent consumption and
generation. This paper assesses the market power
potential of prosumers (leader) using a Stackelberg
model formulated as a mathematical program with
equilibrium constraints (MPEC). The MPEC is recast
to a mixed integer program where the Wolfe’s duality
is used to overcome the bilinear terms in the objective
function, and disjunctive constraints are used to replace
complementarity conditions. Our case study shows that
the Stackelberg strategy always yields higher payoff
for the prosumers compared to Cournot and perfect
competition cases. Moreover, the social surplus resulted
from Stackelberg equilibrium, compared to the other
strategies, is the highest (lowest) when the prosumer
is in short (long) position. Our analysis contributes to
understanding the potential outcomes when prosumers
are introduced to marketplace in the power sector.

1.

Introduction

The power sector is going through rapid
transformations in terms of available technologies
and architecture. Driven by a need for decarbonization,
sustainability, and resilience, we have witnessed a
remarkable move towards advancing and deploying
distributed renewable as well as price-responsive energy
management systems. These include both demand
response and storage, which altogether form the broader
concept of distributed energy resources (DERs). This
paradigm shift towards a more engaged demand-side
challenges the conventional, top-down power grid
architecture based on supply-side and calls for a new
market design for the power sector. Aggregators,
that facilitate the interaction between prosumers and
the wholesale market by collecting and integrating
DERs, would play an increasingly important role in the
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reliability and efficiency of power markets by offering
aggregated energy bundles. These energy products
are procured from a wide set of geographically and
technologically different sources, rom rooftop solar
panels to electric vehicle charging and smart energy
management systems. This, consequently, emphasizes
the significance distribution-level operations of the
power market with emerging prosumers [1].
In
particular, as these prosumers, with the ability of
concurrent generation and consumption, are introduced
to the power sector, it is expected to trigger changes in
economic incentives, which might create opportunities
for manipulations, thereby undermining efficiency of
the power market.
To align incentives with the desired outcomes of
the power market, it is imperative to assess how might
the new entity, prosumers, impact market outcomes
given current market rules. Game-theoretical models
have extensively been used to evaluate electricity
market outcomes, see for example [2] and [3]. The
strength of the approach is that it allows representing
the interactions among different market participants,
especially new ones, while considering market rules and
other institutional settings.
A recent thread of literature has also been focused
on the role of aggregators as middle-men in the
power sector that operate DERs on behalf of owners
over a wide and diverse set of geographical area and
form a considerable capacity in terms of DERs as
bundled and offered into the market [4], [5]. The
heterogeneity in terms of geographical placement and
type of resources empowers the prosumers in the
market, as the information is likely to be private only
known by prosumers. This also calls for a need for
examining DER’s market power potential in the market
as in [6]. Other studies have shown that even low levels
of wind penetration could enable exercise of market
power, leading to welfare loss [7].
Several studies have addressed power market
outcomes in presence of this asymmetrical information
situation for aggregators. For instance, [8] examines
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the impact of a DR aggregator operating a green
energy management system on the wholesale market
by implementing a quantity-based (Cournot) strategy.
The paper, however, i) does not reflect the dual nature
of a prosumer in terms of concurrent generation and
consumption, and ii) is limited to Cournot strategy by
the aggregator, which is just one of the several strategies
at the aggregator’s disposal. In a more recent work,
[9], a game in the electricity market is modeled in a
Stackelberg setting where the aggregator is the leader,
and the grid operator along with other producers are
the followers. The paper finds that the aggregator who
operates a fleet of renewable generation units is able to
exercise significant market power by curtailment of its
power output. Here, as in [8], the aggregator is basically
modeled as a supplier and is unable to reflect the buyer’s
power a prosumer can demonstrate. Paper [10] is closely
related to ours. The paper examines the economic
efficiency loss associated with aggregator, a leader, who
acts as intermediate entity that facilitaes prosumers’
access to the bulk market. Numerical example illustrates
improved efficiency in the market brought in by DER
participation is offset by the for-profit aggregator.
Therefore, while leader-follower models, such as [9]
[10], can provide useful insight into how prosumers
can exercise market power, a Stackelberg formulation
that explicitly takes the dual nature of prosumers
into account and endogenizes power price formation
is therefore of particular interest. The Stackelberg
game has long been used to model sequential move
games or leader-follower situations [11]. Examples
of Stackelberg model applications in the energy sector
include [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18].

is able to do better economically, even only marginally,
than price-taking and Cournot strategies in a Stackelberg
equilibrium regardless of the levels of renewable
capacity (or output). For other market participants
and outcomes, the result of the Stackelberg strategy is
in-between those of Cournot and perfect competition,
thereby consistent with economic theory. The impact
on social surplus under the Stackelebrg equilibrium,
however, is ambiguous, depending on the prosumer’s
position in equilibrium. In the short position, the
Stackelberg equilibrium yields the highest social surplus
with the prosumer acting as an informed consumer;
while in the long position, the social surplus resulting
from Stackelberg equilibrium is the lowest compared
to Cournot and perfect competition as the prosumer
behaves as a producer with more leverage.

In this paper, we build on previous work [19]
to examine prosumers’ market power potential.
Particularly, we formulate the power market in a
Stackelberg setting where the prosumer is the leader
with other agents as followers. In this case, the prosumer
has an information advantage and is able to internalize
the best responses of other market participants into its
own profit maximization problem. The optimization
problem of the prosumer constitutes a mathematical
program with equilibrium constraints or MPEC, which
is difficult to solve due to its non-convexity in feasible
set. Moreover, the resulting objective function contains
bilinear terms, including the product of dual and primal
variables, thereby posing numerical challenges. We
overcome this difficulty by using Wolfe’s duality
and disjunctive representation of complementarity
conditions and recast the problem into a mixed integer
quadratic program.

where x ∈ Rn , y ∈ Rm , f : Rm+n → R,
F : Rm+n → Rm , and Z ⊆ Rm+n . We also
define a set-valued mapping C : Rn → Rm that is a
closed convex subset of Rm for each x ∈ Rn . Letting
X be the projection of Z onto Rn , for all x ∈ X,
S(x) is the solution of variational inequality defined as
(v − y)> F (x, y) ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ C(x).
In other words, an MPEC is an optimization
problem that includes equilibrium or complementarity
constraints (the variational inequality y ∈ S(x)). One
can also think of an MPEC as optimization problem
faced by a leader (upper level problem) whose actions
impact the equilibrium of a market (lower level problem)
which, in turn, impacts the objective of the leader. The
next section discusses this in detail.

When applying the model to the IEEE RTS 24-bus
system, the numerical results indicate that the prosumer

Here, we introduce the upper and lower level
optimization problems in the market, including

2.
2.1.

Model Setup
Mathematical Programs with
Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC)

Mathematical
Programs
with
Equilibrium
Constraints are a class of optimization problems
where the constraint set is in a complementarity form.
Formally, according to [20], an MPEC is formulated as:
minimize

f (x, y)

(1a)

subject to

2.2.

(x, y) ∈ Z,

(1b)

y ∈ S(x)

(1c)

Upper and Lower Level Market Players
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consumers, prosumers, producers, and the grid operator.
In what follows, we first introduce the notations that are
used throughout the paper and then explain how each
agent participates in the market.
Let I denote the set of nodes (or locations) and K
be the set of transmission lines consisting of elements in
ordered pairs of distinct nodes. F is the set of generation
firms, and H is set of generation units hence Hf i ∈ H
is the set of generation units owned by firm f at node
i. We also introduce Ω and ∆ as the set of primal and
dual variables, respectively. Finally, we note that the
Greek variables within the parenthesis to the right of an
equation render the corresponding dual variable.
In this study, the prosumer is the modeled as
the leader in a Stackelberg game. The prosumer at
node i is assumed to possess some renewable capacity
with a negligible short-run marginal cost.1 The output
from renewable is denoted by Ki , which is uncertain
because it is dependent on available natural resources,
e.g., solar and wind. Meanwhile, the prosumer also
owns a dispatchable or backup resource with a capacity
of Gi in order to hedge against uncertain output Ki .
2.2.1. Upper-Level Problem For the purposes of
this study, the prosumer’s benefit function of consuming
electricity is given by Bi (li ), where li corresponds to
the quantity consumed by prosumer when renewable
output equals Ki 2 . Since the prosumer owns zero
marginal cost renewable with an expected output of Ki ,
the function Bi is formulated as “forgone” benefit of
consumption if its consumption is less than Ki . The
benefit function B(·) is assumed to be increasing and
strictly concave. The monotonicity of B(·) indicates
that the prosumer’s objective function is increasing in
the level of consumption. We posit that a prosumer
maximizes its profit by deciding on i) amount of power
to buy from (zf i < 0) or sell to (zf i > 0) firm f in node
i through bilateral contracts3 , ii) amount of foregone
consumption, Ki − li , and iii) amount of power to be
generated from the backup dispatchable technology, gi .
We also assume that the prosumer is only allowed to
1 Individual

“behind-the-meter” prosumers, e.g., owner of a
roof-top solar panel, might have limited access to the wholesale or
bulk market and be subject to fixed tariff when selling their surplus
power back to the grid. We assume that the prosumer (or a aggregator)
that we present here is a result of the aggregation of a large number of
prosumers, thereby allowing to interact with the bulk market directly.
2 B is entirely separate and different from p (d ), which
i
i i
represents willingness-to-pay or benefit of consumers in the wholesale
market. It represents a local benefit function centered around
consumption level at Ki . As a prosumer engages in the market,
directly through bilateral trading with firms, there is limited
opportunity for the market to solicit prosumers’ preferences through
market settlements, i.e., a preference revelation process.
3 Because the equivalence between a power market based on
pool-type transactions and on bi-lateral contracts have been alluded
to in [3], we believe that our assumption herein is reasonable and can
be seen as an extension.

sell/buy from node i [21]. The optimization problem
faced by the prosumer at node i is displayed as follows.

maximize
zf i , li , gi

pi

X

Z

Ki

zf i −

f

Bi0 (x)dx − Cig (gi )

li

(2a)
subject to
X
zf i + li − Ki − gi ≤ 0,

(2b)

f

gi ≤ Gi
X
−
zf i − li ≤ 0

(κi ),

(2c)

(µi ),

(2d)

f

li , gi ≥ 0.
The three terms in the objective function of (2),
in order, correspond to revenue (+) or cost (-) from
transactions with the wholesale market, foregone benefit
(if Ki > li ) or incremental benefit (if li > Ki ) of
consuming power, and generation costs incurred from
backup generation, respectively. Three constraints are
associated with the prosumers’ problem. (2b) states that
the sum of renewable output Ki and selfP
generation gi
net of sales to the wholesale market or f zf i has to
be greater than the quantity consumed li . (2c) limits
the output gi by its capacity Gi , and (2d) indicates that
prosumers cannot purchase more than its demand.
While a prosumer only participates in the wholesale
market indirectly through bilateral contracts rather than,
say directly submitting bids into the market, one can
assume that it acquires “strategic” knowledge through
its repeated observations of power price clearance
processes of the wholesale market.

maximize
xf ih , yi , di

X

Pi0 di −

i

Pi0 2  X
d −
Cf ih (xf ih )
2Q0i i
f ih

(3a)
subject to
xf ih ≤

(βf ih ),

− xf ih ≤
X
P T DFki yi − Tk ≤

(3b)
0

(εf ih ),

(3c)

0

(λ+
k ),

(3d)

0

(λ−
k ),

(3e)

i

−

X

P T DFki yi − Tk ≤

i
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X

di −

xf ih −

f,h∈Hf i

X

X

zf i =yi

(ηi ),

(3f)

f

yi =

0

(θ),

(3g)

0

(ξi )

(3h)

i

− di ≤

The lower level problem is the social surplus
maximization problem faced by the grid operator and
is formulated in (3). Constraint (3f) is the nodal balance
with prosumer’s output (zf i ) embedded. The balance
between supply and demand is implied in (3g).
2.2.2. Lower-Level Problem
X

maximize
Ω∪∆

i

ηi

X



Z

Ki

zf i −

f

Bi0 (x)dx − Cig (gi )

li

(4a)
subject to
X
(zf i ) + li − Ki − gi ≤ 0,

(4b)

f

gi ≤ Gi
−

Cf0 ih (xf ih )

Pi0 −

,

(4c)

− βf ih + εf ih + ηi = 0

f, i, h,
(4d)

Pi0
di − ηi + ξi =
Q0i

0

∀i ∈ I,
(4e)

−

X

−
(λ+
k − λk )P T DFki + ηi − θ =0

∀i ∈ I,

k

(4f)
0 ≤ βf ih ⊥ (xf ih − Xf ih )
X
X
di −
xf ih −
zf i =
f,h∈Hf i

0 ≤ λ+
k ⊥

≤ 0,

(4g)

yi ,

(4h)

≤ 0,

(4i)

≤ 0,

(4j)

f

X

P T DFki yi − Tk

i

0 ≤ λ−
k ⊥−

X

P T DFki yi − Tk

i

X

yi = 0,

(4k)

i

0 ≤ εf ih ⊥ xf ih

≥ 0,

(4l)

0 ≤ ξi ⊥ di

≥ 0,

(4m)

of each generation firm as a decision variable but
rather decides on their output (xf ih ) and the bilateral
transaction with the prosumer (zf i ). However, once
xf ih and zf i are decided by the solution of the
problem, the sales balance for the generation firm holds
automatically and would be consistent with (3f) and
(3g). Furthermore, the grid operator welfare/surplus
maximization problem does not directly involve the
grid operator revenues. However, we calculate the
revenues of the grid operator by calculating the flows
and recovering the transmission charge (wi ), which
indicates the price ($/MW) charged by the grid owner
to move power from hub to node i. This transmission
charge is equal to the difference between the hub price
and price at node i which are readily calculated in the
model [14].

2.3.

MPEC Formulation

Following the formal definition of MPEC in Section
2.1, we introduce the leader-follower formulation of the
Stackelberg in the electricity market.
Here, the upper-level problem is the prosumer’s
benefit maximization, and the lower-level problem is
the equilibrium (or complementarity) conditions in the
market derived from the grid operator’s social surplus
maximization problem. The MPEC formulation is given
in (4).
The objective function is the benefit of the prosumer
with prices derived from the dual variable associated
with the nodal balance constraint in the lower-level
problem. Constraints (4b)–(4d) indicate the operational
constraints of the prosumer. Constraints (4e) – (4m)
include the optimality conditions of the lower level
problem that, together with the nodal balance constraint,
form the complementarity problem characterizing the
equilibrium of the market.
The problem is subject to two forms
P of
non-convexities in (4): the bilinear term (ηi f zf i )
in the objective function and the complementarity
conditions defining the constraint set. We overcome
these by, first, replacing the complementarity conditions
with disjunctive constraints [22]. We then bypass the
bilinear terms by applying the Wolfe’s duality and recast
the problem into a mixed integer quadratic program
(MIQP).

3.

Numerical Example

li , gi ≥ 0.

3.1.

Assumptions

So, constraint (3g) implicitly incorporates the supply
and demand balance. Notice that the social surplus
maximization problem does not include sales (sf i )

The model is applied to the IEEE Reliability
Test System (aggregator) [23]. The topology of the
system consists of 24 buses, 38 transmission lines,
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and 17 constant-power loads with a total of 2,850
MW. We aggregate 32 generators into 13 generators
by combining those with the same marginal cost and
located at the same node. Six generation units, however,
are excluded from the dataset since they are hydro power
units, which operate at their maximum output of 50 MW
[24]. Because the wholesale market is assumed to be
perfectly competitive, we assume that all the generators
are owned by a single firm. In order to be able to analyze
the impact of transmission congestion, the capacity of
line 7 in the test case is reduced to 150 MW. The
marginal cost of generation is represented by a quadratic
function parameterized by C0 and C1 as the coefficient
for the linear and quadratic term, respectively. While
using the IEEE RTS 24-bus system might be overly
simplified the real-world power system, it allows us
to focus on the impacts of strategic prosumers on the
market.
Furthermore, the prosumer, or the leader, is assumed
to be located at node 1 with the same preferences and
quantity demanded of power consumption as consumers
located in that node. That is, both the prosumer and
the consumers in node 1 are assumed to have the same
demand function. The prosumer owns a renewable
generating unit that produces a variant amount of
power (contingent on available natural resources) and a
dispatchable unit as a backup option.
The RTS 24-Bus case is first formulated as a
least-cost minimization problem and solved with fixed
nodal load in order to get dual variables associated with
load constraints. The dual variables together with an
assumed price elasticity of -0.2 is then used to calculate
Pi0 and Q0i . The magnitude of price elasticity of demand
is comparable with what has been reported in [25].
We examine three scenarios, varied by the levels
of renewable output from the units owned by the
prosumers. More specifically, renewables output K1 is
assumed to have three levels: 25, 50, and 120 MW. The
levels might seem too big for an individual prosumer to
amass. One can consider the entity as a super prosumer
or an aggregator who represents a plethora of small
prosumers. Also, These levels are chosen carefully in
order to illustrate market outcomes.

3.2.

Results and Discussion

Table 1 summarizes market outcomes when the
prosumer is formulated as a Stackelberg leader for three
scenarios: 25, 50, and 120 MW of renewable generation.
As indicated in the first row of Table 1, prosumer’s
changes from purchase (-) to sale (+) with increased
levels of renewable output. For cases with 25 and
50 MW , the prosumer buys 59.50 MWh and 39.61

Table 1. Results of the MPEC Model
Variables \Scenarios
Renewable output [MW]
Prosumer’s sale(+)/purchase(-) [MWh]
Prosumer’s load [MWh]
Prosumer’s generation [MWh]
Marginal cost of backup [$/MWh]
Prosumer’s surplus [$K]
Total power demand [MWh]
Total power production [MWh]
Power price in node 1 [$/MWh]
Sale-weighted power price [$/MWh]
Grid operator’s revenue [$K]
Producers’ surplus [$K]
Consumers’ surplus [$K]
Social Surplus [$K]

(a)
25
-59.50
99.48
14.97
49.97
9.85
2,848.55
2,908.05
45.21
35.48
9.67
41.93
255.89
307.49

(b)
50
-39.61
101.40
11.79
46.79
11.06
2,852.16
2,891.77
43.62
35.38
8.15
42.89
256.36
307.40

(c)
120
18.61
105.83
4.44
39.44
14.05
2,858.69
2,840.08
40.35
35.17
5.14
44.98
257.25
307.37

MWh, respectively. Thus, it is in a short position. As
expected, the quantity of the purchases decreases as
the prosumer’s renewable output grows. In the third
column, where the renewable output is equal to 120
MW, the prosumer lies in a long position in equilibrium
and sells (positive quantity) 18.61 MWh to the power
market.
Prosumer’s quantity demanded, or load, indicated in
the second row of Table 1. Similarly, it increases as
the prosumer has more renewable generation resources
available and is equal to 99.48, 101.40, and 105.83
MWh for columns (a), (b), and (c), respectively.
Having more zero marginal cost renewable by the
prosumer (moving from (a) to (c)) implicitly shifts
the supply curve to the right, leading to an increase
in electricity consumption. This in turn decreases
prosumer’s generation from the dispatchable unit where
the prosumer requires less generation from the backup
unit given higher levels of renewable capacity. This
effectively reduces the marginal cost of the backup unit
as more renewable resources become available as shown
in Table 1 where the marginal cost of the backup unit
decreases from 49.97 $/MWh in column (a) to 39.44
$/MWh in column (c).
Turning to prosumer’s profit, the prosumer benefits
from having more renewable generation output. This
is because having more zero marginal cost resources,
the prosumer is able to rely less on backup unit (lower
operating cost), sell more to (buying less from) the
market, thereby leading to higher benefit. As seen in
Table 1 (also in Figure 2), the prosumer surplus follows
an increasing trend of 9.85, 11.06, and 14.05 ($K) for
25, 50, and 120 MW of renewable output, respectively.
The power price in node 1, where the prosumer
resides, is directly affected by the available renewables:
it drops with an increasing amount of renewables. For
example, when the renewable capacity is 25 MW,
power price at node 1 is 45.21 $/MWh, which is
reduced to 43.62 and 40.35 $/MWh if the renewable
generation capacity is 50 and 120 MW, respectively.
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We can also observe that, over the entire grid, the
sale-weighted average price of electricity is reduced
as the prosumer possesses more renewable generation
output. As indicated in Table 1, the sale-weighted power
price is reduced from 35.48 $/MWh in column (a) to
35.38 $/MWh and 35.17 $/MWh in columns (b) and (c),
respectively.
As the sale-weighted power price decreases with
higher levels of renewable output owned by the
prosumer, the total demand in the market increases
when more zero marginal cost resource is available. As
shown in Table 1, the total power demanded follows an
increasing trend of 2,848.55 to 2,852.16 and 2,858.69
MWh from columns (a) to (c) as the prosumer’s
renewable output increases. Similarly, with more
renewables, the prosumer engages in less purchase from
the market (if in the short position) or sells more to the
market (if in the long position), thereby mitigating the
need of generation from conventional producers, hence
reducing the total power generation from conventional
units. This is shown in Table 1, where total power
production is decreased from 2,908.05 MWh in the case
of 25 MW renewable capacity to 2,891.77 MWh and
2,840.08 MWh when the renewable capacity is 50 and
120 MW, respectively.
Since less generation from conventional units means
that the the grid operator would need to move less
power around in the grid, the grid operator’s revenue
decreases with higher levels of renewable capacity for
the prosumer. Table 1 illustrates the fact that the grid
operator’s revenue ($k) is reduced from 9.67 in the case
of 25 MW renewable capacity to 8.15 and 5.14 when the
renewable capacity is 50 and 120 MW, respectively.
The producer’s surplus increases with amount of
renewable available to the prosumer. Although the
right-shift of supply curve (due to growing renewable)
effectively lowers the equilibirum prices, the profit
earned by producers is more than made-up by power
sales, leading to an increase in profits. This is illustrated
in Table 1 where the producer surplus (in $k) increases
from 41.93 to 42.89 and 44.98 in columns (a), (b), and
(c), respectively.
With increased consumption (demand) and lower
prices, the consumers are poised to gain from increased
levels of prosumer’s renewable output. Indeed, this
is what emerges in Table 1 where the consumer
surplus (in k$) increases monotonically from 255.89
to 256.36 and 257.25 in columns (a), (b), and (c).
The grid operator’s revenue loss from increased levels
of prosumer’s renewable capacity is not sufficiently
compensated by the growth in prosumer, consumers,
and producers’ surplus, and hence the social surplus
decreases as the prosumer possesses more renewable

Table 2. Prosumer Surplus [$K] Following Different
Strategies

Strategy \Scenarios
Renewable output [MW]
Stackelberg
Price-Taker
Cournot

(a)
25
9.85
9.83
9.23

(b)
50
11.06
11.05
10.78

(c)
120
14.05
14.05
13.99

generation capacity. This is shown in Table 1 where the
social surplus (in $k) is 307.49, 307.40, and 307.37 for
25, 50, and 120 MW of renewable capacity, respectively.
Table 2 (also in Figure 2) illustrates the prosumer
surplus under different strategies in the power market
with different levels of renewable generation output.
In column (a), where the prosumer’s zero marginal
cost resource is equal to 25 MW, the solution indicates
that Stackelberg strategy yields a higher level of profit
for the prosumer, although indiscernible from that of
price-taker in Figure 2. Namely, the leader-follower
equilibrium of the game induced in the power market
would yield a surplus of $9.85K which is higher
than that of a price-taker strategy with a profit of
$9.83K and $9.23K for the case of Cournot strategy;
a similar pattern can be seen in column (b) and (c).
When the prosumer renewable generation capacity is
50 MW, the surplus following a Stackelberg strategy
is $11.06K which is higher than $11.05K and $10.78K
for the cases of price-taker and Cournot strategies,
respectively. In column (c), where the renewable
generation capacity is 120 MW, we observe that
Stackelberg and perfect competition equilibria yield an
equal prosumer surplus of $14.05K, which is higher
than the $13.99K surplus for the Cournot case. This
indicates that as the prosumer’s renewable generation
generation increases, we begin to see the closing of the
gap in prosumer surplus following different strategies.
In other words, the prosumer plays a more pivotal role
in the market, and hence in regard to its own profits,
with lower levels of renewable capacity and as the zero
marginal cost resources are expanded, the overwhelming
increase on the supply-side undermines the choice of
strategy. To further analyze the impact of prosumer
presence in power markets, we compare the outcomes
of a Stackelberg formulation to the cases of perfect
competition and Cournot with various levels of Ki
ranging from 25MW–120MW.
First, we look at the prosumer’s output or interaction
in the market. Figure 1 plots the prosumer’s sale (+)
or purchase (-) in perfect competition (PC), Cournot
and Stackelberg cases against the zero-marginal cost
renewable’s output in x-axis from 25 to 120 MW.
The horizontal dotted line crossing zero on the y-axis
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Figure 2. Prosumer’s Surplus under various levels of
renewable capacity
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indicates the island mode where the prosumer is isolated
from the grid. The prosumer surplus or benefit is also
plotted in Figure 2 for different levels of renewable
capacity. Despite the lines overlapping, in fact, the
prosumer surplus in the Stackelberg equilibrium, for any
level of renewable capacity, is higher than that of perfect
competition and Cournot as in Table 2.
Figure 1 also indicates that, in the short position
when the prosumer purchases from the grid, for any
level of renewable output, the quantity purchased under
the Stackelberg strategy is sandwiched between PC
and Cournot. The same phenomenon is observed for
the long position when the prosumer sells power to
the grid. In other words, the prosumer following a
Stackelberg strategy would reduce purchases (sales) in
the short (long) position compared to the case of perfect
competition but increase purchases (sales) in the short
(long) position compared to the Cournot case. In [19],
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Figure 3. Power price in the prosumer’s node (#1)
against various levels of renewables

42

43

44

Perfect Competition
Cournot
Stackelberg

41

Price at Prsoumer Node ($/MWh)

20
0
-20
-40

Perfect Competition
Cournot
Stackelberg

-60

Prosumer Sales (+)/Purchase (-) (MW)

Figure 1. Prosumer’s sales (+) or purchase (-)
under various levels of renewables

40

60

80

100

120

Prosumer's Zero Marginal Cost Renewable Output (MW)

we show that the prosumer is always better off when
behaving as a price-taker. This is consistent with our
observations in Figure 1 as the prosumer’s sell/purchase
in the Stackelberg is distanced from the Cournot case
and closer to the plot for the perfect competition.
Figure 3 shows the changes in the price at the
prosumer’s node given various levels of renewable
generation output. Consistent with the finding in Table
1, the price monotonically decreases as the prosumer
possesses larger amounts of renewable output, thereby
increasing supply and hence reducing the price. This
pattern holds also for all three strategies. The vertical
dotted line close to the 100 MW on the horizontal
axis indicates the island mode where the prosumer is
“isolated” from the main grid. To the left of the vertical
dotted line indicates that the prosumer experiences
a short position in equilibrium where the prosumer
purchases power from the market, and to the right is
the long position where the prosumer sells power to
the market. Again, we observe that the outcomes (in
this case, the price) in the Stackelberg formulation is
sandwiched between those of the perfect competition
and Cournot cases regardless of the prosumer’s position
(short or long) in the market. This is consistent with
what we observed in Figure 1. In the long position,
where the prosumer output (supply) is less than the
price-taker and more than the Cournot case, the price
in the Stackelberg equilibrium would consequently be
higher than the price-taker and lower than the Cournot
case as shown in Figure 3. The same argument applies
for the short position.
The joint impact of prosumer’s behavior and amount
of renewables is also propagated to the rest of the
grid. Figure 4 gives results of the wholesale market’s
sale-weighted price. Similar to the findings in Figure 3,
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it shows that the average market price in the Stackelberg
equilibrium, regardless of the amount of renewables, is
in-between that of the perfect competition and Cournot
cases. The sale-weighted prices also decline with
an increasing amount of renewables possessed by the
prosumer.
Economic rent distributed among entities in the
power market is displayed in Figures 5–7. Figure 5
illustrates the producer’s surplus. Again, the horizontal
axis is the prosumer’s renewable output; the vertical axis
indicates the producer surplus in [k$] and the vertical
dotted line indicates the island mode. The outcome
of the Stackelberg equilibrium lies in between those of
perfect competition and Cournot cases. Since in the
Stackelberg equilibrium, the prosumer output is higher
(lower) than the perfect competition (Cournot) case, the
generation cost (and hence the producer surplus) would
also be higher (lower) than the perfect competition

257.0
256.4

Perfect Competition
Cournot
Stackelberg

255.8

Perfect Competition
Cournot
Stackelberg

40

Figure 6. Consumer’s surplus against various levels
of renewables
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(Cournot) as shown in Figure 5, independent of the level
of prosumer renewable output.
Figure 6 illustrates the consumer’s surplus resulting
from different strategies by the prosumer in the power
market given various levels of prosumer renewable
generation output. As discussed in Table 1, the
consumer’s surplus monotonically increases with higher
levels of prosumer renewable output regardless of
the underlying strategy as more renewable output is
equivalent to more supply-side zero marginal cost
resources. We observe that the consumer’s surplus
in the Stackelberg equilibrium is sandwiched between
that of perfect competition and Cournot equilibria. In
the short position, when the prosumer, as the leader,
decreases (increases) power price compared to the
perfect competition (Cournot) cases, the consumer’s
surplus is consequently increased (reduced) compared
to the perfect competition (Cournot) case as shown
in Figure 6. Similarly, in the long position, once
the prosumer increases (decreases) power prices in
the Stackelberg equilibrium compared to those of
perfect competition (Cournot), the consumer surplus
consequently increases (decreases) above (below) the
levels of Cournot (perfect competition).
Figure 7 suggests that the grid operator’s revenues
are monotonically decreasing with the amounts of
prosumer’s renewable output as higher levels of zero
marginal cost resources would mitigate the need for
generation, thereby utilizing less transmission, lowering
the grid operator’s revenues. Interestingly, for the grid
operator’s revenues as well, we are able to observe
the outcome of the Stackelberg equilibrium lying
in-between that of Cournot and perfect competition.
In the short position, focusing on the Stackelberg
equilibrium, the prosumer purchase is less (more) than
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under the Stackelberg case, it actually decreases with
the increased level of renewable output. A further
comparison among different cases suggests that this is
mainly because the increases in the consumers’ and
producers’ surplus in Figures 6 and 5 is more than
offset by the drop of the grid operator’s revenue in
Figure 7, leading to a decline in the social surplus.
Second, the prosumer’s strategy yields different order
of the social surplus among cases in the short and long
position. In particular, unlike cases in previous figures,
the social surplus is no longer sandwiched between the
price-taker and Cournot cases, thereby deviating from
the conventional wisdom. The fact that the prosumer is
“not” part of the wholesale market might be the source
of the difference.
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Figure 8. Social surplus against various levels of
renewables
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that of Cournot (perfect competition), which in turn
necessitates less (more) power generation (and power
flow, hence the grid operator’s revenues) compared to
the cases of perfect competition (Cournot). In the long
position, similarly, the prosumer’s sale to the market
in the Stackelberg equilibrium is more (less) than that
of Cournot (perfect competition), which leads to less
(more) need for power generation from conventional
producers and hence less (more) power to be moved
around the grid that leads to less (more) grid operator’s
revenues compared to Cournot (perfect competition)
case.
Figure 8 displays the wholesale’s social surplus
(exclusive of prosumer’s profit) under three cases over
various renewable output. Two observations emerge.
First, the social surplus monotonically increases with
levels of renewable output for Cournot and perfect
competition cases. However, somehow surprisingly,

Conclusions

Prosumers, an emerging entity for enhancing
sustainability and resilience of the power sector, are
expected to play an increasingly important role in
the electricity market.
The dual nature of the
prosumer, i.e., their ability of concurrent generation and
consumption, while introducing new opportunities, also
poses significant challenges in the energy sector. The
present paper extends the existing work on the role of
prosumers in the electricity market by formulating the
prosumers as a leader within a Stackelberg framework.
We model the prosumer as an agent, possessing limited
renewable as well as dispatchable generation capacity,
maximizing its net benefit by deciding on the level of
trade (sale or purchase of power) with the wholesale
market, level of forgone consumption, and level of
generation from the dispatchable unit.
We investigate the market outcomes in a Stackelberg
setting and compare the results to those where the
prosumer is designated as a price-taker and a Cournot
entity in the market. The results indicate that market
outcomes are affected by the prosumer’s strategy, i.e.,
price-taking, Cournot, and Stackleberg, as well as
the amount of its possessed renewables. Possessing
relatively lower (higher) renewable, the prosumer
behaves as consumers (producers) and purchase from
(sell to) the main grid. The outcomes of the Stackelberg
competition lie between those of Cournot (least
competitive) and perfect competition (most competitive)
scenarios.
For instance, price-taking prosumers
purchase more power from the main grid, followed by
Stackelberg and Cournot (see Figure 1). Under the
relatively larger amount of renewable, the outcomes
asymptotically approach that of perfect competition.
This observation is consistently observed in Figures 1-4,
and 6. However, although the impact of the strategic
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prosumer on each of the market participants in the
Stackelberg case was in between perfect competition
and imperfect competition (Cournot), its impact on
the social surplus is ambiguous. More specifically,
in the short position, the prosumer in the Stackelberg
equilibrium increases the social surplus, higher than
perfect competition and Cournot. On the other hand,
in the long position, the prsumer’s strategy leads to a
decline in social surplus, lowest compared to perfect
competition and Cournot cases.
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